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Abstract
We study the eﬀect of entry on costs and competition in the Portuguese mobile telephony
industry. We construct and estimate a model that includes demand, network, and cost
equations. The latter accounts for ineﬃciency and cost reducing eﬀort. Our results suggest
that the entry of a third operator in 1998 lead to significant cost reductions, and fostered
competition. We also show that failure to account for cost reducing eﬀort leads to biased
estimates of competition in the industry. Finally, we also find that our estimated price-cost
margins are similar to hypothetical Nash margins, if firms are patient, and have optimistic
beliefs about the industry growth.
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1 Introduction
We analyze the mobile telecommunications industry in Portugal. We first test whether
cost reduction and competition were aﬀected by the entry of an additional firm in 1998 and the
liberalization of fixed telephony in 2000. Second, we focus on the pricing behavior of the firms.
With a dynamic model, we shed light on whether firms cared for immediate profits, or whether
they were more concerned with increasing their customer base during the period we study.
A common practice in the empirical industry models that focus on oligopolistic frameworks
is to assume that firms are eﬃcient and costs are exogenous. This is in contradiction with
a rich empirical tradition related to the measurement of eﬃciency through the estimation of
production and cost functions (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
Moreover, the recent literature on incentives proposed a theoretical framework to account for
the eﬀect of cost reduction by firms, emphasizing the endogeneity of costs (Laﬀont, 1994). This
literature suggests that the firms’ endogenous eﬀort, depends closely on the constraints exerted
by the competitive or regulatory environment it faces.
We construct and estimate an industry model that includes cross-price elasticities, and
where firms choose both prices and cost reducing eﬀort. The model consists of a system of
equations that accounts for the demand, network, and the technology of each firm. Technology
is described by a cost function that includes two non-observable parameters: the exogenous
technical ineﬃciency of each firm, and cost reducing eﬀort. Cost reducing eﬀort can be expressed
by taking into account the competitive pressures impinging on the activity of each firm before
and after the entry of a third firm or the liberalization of the telecommunications industry.
The Portuguese mobile telephony industry provides a suitable application for the framework
we have in mind. In Portugal, the firm associated with the incumbent, Tmn, started its
activity in 1989 with the analogue technology C-450. In 1991, the sectorial regulator, ICP-
ANACOM, assigned two licenses to operate the digital technologyGSM 900. One of the licenses
was assigned to Tmn. The other license was assigned to the entrant Vodafone. In 1997, the
regulator assigned three licenses to operate the digital technology GSM 1800. Two licenses
were assigned to Tmn and Vodafone. A third license was assigned to the entrant Optimus,
which was also granted a license to operate GSM 900.1 Finally, the legislation of the EU
imposed the full liberalization of the telecommunications industry at the end of the nineties.
1Both of the licenses for GSM 900 and for GSM 1800 were assigned through public tenders, following the
EU Directives 91/287 and 96/2, respectively. The first Directive instructed member states to adopt the GSM
standard, and the second to grant at least 2 GSM 900 licenses and to allow additional firms to use GSM 1800.
System GSM 900 operates on the 900 MHz frequency. System GSM 1800 operates on the 1800 MHz frequency.
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The liberalization aﬀected essentially fixed line services. After 1998, any firm licensed by the
sectorial regulator could oﬀer fixed telephony services, either through direct access based on
their own infrastructures, or through indirect access, available for all types of calls. In Portugal
the liberalization took eﬀect in 2000.2 Note that the entry ofOptimus and the 2000 liberalization
were independent and exogenous events, determined largely at the EU level.
After its inception in 1989, the Portuguese mobile telephony industry had a fast diﬀusion
(Pereira and Pernias, 2004), which led to high and rising penetration rates. After entering the
market in 1992, Vodafone gained revenue market share rapidly, as shown in Figure 1. During
the duopoly period, i.e., from 1992 to 1997, Tmn and Vodafone essentially shared the market.
The entry of Optimus led to an asymmetric split of the market, which suggests that this event
had a significant impact in the industry.
[Figure 1]
The objective of our work is threefold. First, we test whether the entry of Optimus in
1998, or the full liberalization of the telecommunications industry in 2000, gave firms stronger
incentives to reduce costs. Note that economic theory has no simple prediction about the
relation between the number of competitors in a market, and incentives to reduce costs.3 We
construct a cost function that accounts for the firms’ cost reducing eﬀort, and test several
scenarios of incentive pressures against each other, in order to identify which fits the data
better. We show that cost reducing eﬀort increased significantly after the entry of Optimus in
1998, while the 2000 liberalization had only a mild impact on cost reduction.4
Second, with several tests, we show that our model improves upon a simple cost function
with no ineﬃciency and no eﬀort. We discuss alternative explanations for cost reduction after
2The liberalization was promoted by, among others, the Council Directive 90/387/EEC, the Commission
Directive 90/388/EEC, Council Resolution 93/C213/01, and the Commission Directive 96/19/EC. The oﬃcial
date for the liberalization was 1998. Portugal, like other countries, benefited from a derogation (Commission
Decision 97/310/EC).
3The likely eﬀect of the entry is a decrease in prices. If in addition the quantity produced by each firm
increases, then firms have more incentives to invest in marginal cost reducing eﬀort. If, however, the quantity
produced by each firm decreases, firms have less incentives to invest in cost reduction. See Pereira (2001) for a
model where lower prices can be associated with higher or lower investment in cost reduction.
4Note that, on the one hand, more competition in fixed telephony should have pushed the prices of this service
down, and reduced the substitution between fixed and mobile telephony (Barros and Cadima (2002), Rodini et
al. (2003)). On the other hand, the liberalization involved a tariﬀ rebalancing which increased the telephone
subscription fee and the price of local calls. It is therefore unclear what the impact of the full liberalization of
the telecommunications market in Portugal should have been.
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the entry of Optimus, such as preemptive behavior by the incumbents or spillovers eﬀects at
the industry level, and explain why we discard them.
Third, given these estimates, we retrieve cost and demand parameters to construct marginal
costs, and therefore price-cost margins. The results show that the standard model underesti-
mates the toughness of competition. Using an original dynamic pricing framework, we test
whether price-cost margins correspond to a non-cooperative Nash behavior under alternative
hypothesis, where firm either have a myopic or a long run perspective. We find that estimated
price-cost margins are similar to hypothetical Nash margins, if firms are patient, and have opti-
mistic beliefs about the industry growth. As a by-product, network eﬀects and switching costs
are also identified as playing an important role in this industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the cost, network,
and demand systems. Section 3 proposes a model of firms’ cost reduction activity. Section 4
presents an empirical evaluation of such activity. Section 5 evaluates the competitive forces
in the industry, which entails determining the pricing rules set by firms. Section 6 proposes a
welfare analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Building Blocks of the Model
In what follows, we specify a model of the firms’ behavior that encompasses two important
aspects of our problem. We are interested in representing the firms’ cost reducing activity and
pricing decisions, as well as the interconnection between these two aspects. This entails defining
first a three part structure that includes cost, network growth, and demand equations.
2.1 Demand and Network Growth
We refer to the three firms in the market by their order of entry, e.g., Tmn is firm 1, and
index them with subscript i = 1, 2, 3. We index time through subscript t. The demand of firm
i on period t depends on its price pit and a vector of the competitors’ prices pjt. Moreover,
we account for the consumers’ income rt, the size of its network, i.e., numbers of subscribers,
in the previous period nit−1, and a time trend t. The inclusion of the size of the network in
the previous period could be justified by two non-mutually exclusive reasons. The first reason
involves network economies. The consumers’ marginal valuation of the service depends on the
number of other consumers who belong to the network. However, consumers only observe with
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lag the size of the firms’ networks.5 The second reason involves switching costs or consumer
inertia. An increase in a firm’s price relative to the prices of its rivals induces consumers to
leave the firm. However, if consumers have switching costs, they will not respond immediately,
but only over time. The time trend accounts for changes in preferences or consumer awareness.
Denote by yit the traﬃc, i.e., minutes of communication, supplied by firm i in period t. Each
firm faces a demand of the form:
yit = Di(pit,pjt, rt, nit−1, yit−1, t |α), (1)
where α is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and where the lagged network size term yit−1
is included in order to capture short-run dynamics. Two comments are in order. First, we do
not impose any pattern of substitution between the firms’ products. In particular, we do not
impose that the products are homogeneous. Second, we assume that firms charge linear prices.
This hardly involves any loss of generality, since 80% of the subscribers have pre-paid cards.
We also assume that the size of firm i’s network in period t, depends on its price pit, a vector
of the competitors’ prices pjt, the consumers’ income rt, the size of its network in the previous
period nit−1, and a time trend t. Thus, each firm faces a network function of the form:
nit = Nit(pit,pjt, rt, nit−1, t |γ ), (2)
where γ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The lagged network size term nit−1 is included
in order to capture short-run dynamics. The network function will be useful in Section 5 where
we disentangle short-run from long-run pricing decisions. Equations (1) and (2) give a dynamic
structure to the model in the sense that a firm’s demand in period t depends on its price of the
previous period.
2.2 Costs
We now turn to the cost side of the model. To produce a volume of traﬃc yit, firm i requires
quantities of labor, lit, materials, mit, and capital, kit. Denote by ωlit, ωmit, and ωkit, the price
of labor, materials and capital, respectively.
Denote by cit the observed operating cost of firm i. An important feature of our model
is that the actual operating cost may diﬀer from the minimum operating cost. Ineﬃciency
may prevent firms from reaching the required output level yit at the minimum cost, and this
5Network interconnection obligations mitigate, but do not eliminate network economies. Diﬀerences between
intra and inter network calls resurface the value for a consumer of belonging to a large network as well as the
strategic advantage for a firm of owning a large network.
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may result in upward distorted costs.6 However, firms can undertake cost reducing activities
to counterbalance their ineﬃciency. They can engage in process research and development,
managers may spend time and eﬀort in improving the location of inputs within the network, in
particular reorganizing the position of base transceiver stations, antennas, supporting towers,
base station controllers, upgrading the mobile switching centers. They can as well attempt to
find cheaper suppliers, bargain better procurement contracts, subcontract non-essential activi-
ties, monitor employees, solve potential conflicts, etc. Whatever these cost reducing activities
may be, we will refer to them as eﬀort. Denote by θi and eit, firm i’s ineﬃciency and eﬀort
levels, respectively. Note that these two variables are unobservable. We also allow the possibil-
ity of technical progress, which is captured by a time trend t. Each firm faces a long-run cost
function, conditional on ineﬃciency and eﬀort, of the form:
cit = C(yit, ωlit , ωmit , ωkit , t |θi, eit, β ), (3)
where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Note that while ineﬃciency θi is exogenous,
cost reducing eﬀort eit is a choice variable for firm i, and will therefore depend on the competitive
pressures impinging on the activity of the firm.
In a second step, we need to define the structure of the system of equations (1), (2), and
(3). This entails describing the firms’ pricing and eﬀort decisions. Before entering into the
analysis, it is worth reminding that the pricing structure itself is independent of the nature of
the competitive pressures impinging on the activity of the firm.7 Thus, although prices and
eﬀort are determined simultaneously, the firms’ decisions will be presented separately, for ease
of exposition.
3 Competitive Pressure and Cost Reduction
This section focuses on the construction of the structural cost function. The entry ofOptimus
in 1998, as well as the 2000 liberalization, may have influenced the cost reducing activities of
firms. We propose to account for the competitive pressures potentially unleashed by these two
6There are several ways of thinking about ineﬃciency. First, it may simply be the result of the irreducible
uncertainty that involves the creation of a new production process. This interpretation is in line with Lippman
and Rumelt, (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Jovanovic (1982), and Klepper and Graddy (1990). Alternatively,
ineﬃciency may be related to the quality of the firm’s production factors.
7The way we incorporate the technical ineﬃciency and eﬀort parameters allows the incentive-pricing di-
chotomy principle to hold (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). This means that the same pricing formula applies whether
we assume strong or weak competitive pressures.
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events through the cost function (3) that is conditional on ineﬃciency θi and the eﬀort level ei.
Deriving the equilibrium level of eﬀort and plugging it back into the conditional cost function
allows us to derive a structural cost function that can be estimated. The aim of this approach
is twofold. First, we can test against each other diﬀerent scenarios associated with these two
events in order to determine whether the entry of Optimus or the 2000 market liberalization
had a significant impact on the cost reducing eﬀort of the Portuguese mobile telephony firms.
Second, accounting for these changes in incentives through the cost structure enables us to
reduce the source of mispecification, and avoid biases in the estimation of the technological
parameters.8
As mentioned before, a firm can exert eﬀort eit to reduce its operating costs cit. The cost
reduction activity induces an internal cost Ψ(eit |µ), where µ is a parameter to be estimated.
Taking into consideration the operating cost reduction and the internal cost of eﬀort, the firm
sets the optimal eﬀort level eit that maximizes its profit. Firm i’s profit is the diﬀerence between
revenue Rit = pitDit and total cost cit (eit, .) +Ψ(eit, .):
Πit(pit, eit, nit−1) = pitD(pit,pjt, rt, nit−1, t)− C(yit, ωlit , ωmit , ωkit , t |θi, eit )−Ψ(eit). (4)
Assuming an infinite horizon set-up, a firm’s eﬀort choice problem, given the output level, is:
max
eit
∞X
t=0
Πit(pit, eit, nit−1) s.t. nit = Nit(pit)
Denote by V (nit) the optimal value function for firm i, given the size of the its network nit.
The Bellman equation for firm i’s eﬀort choice problem, given the output level, is:
V (nit−1) = max
eit
{Πit(pit, eit, nit−1) + δV (nit)} . (5)
where δ is the discount factor. The first order condition for eﬀort is:
−∂C(yit, · |θi, eit )
∂eit
= Ψ0(eit), (6)
which implies that the optimal eﬀort level equalizes marginal cost reduction and the marginal
disutility of eﬀort.
We consider two periods. First, a period "B", which refers either to the phase before the
entry of Optimus, or before the 2000 liberalization. And second, a period "A", which refers
8Previous studies have attempted to account for cost endogeneity problems after a change in regulation.
Among them, Parker and Roeller (1997) analyzes the impact of regulatory changes on the competitiveness of
mobile telecommunications markets. Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) shows how firms’ cost reducing activity is
related to the regulatory contracts set by public authorities in the public transit industry.
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either to the phase after the entry of Optimus, or after the 2000 liberalization. We expect firms
to provide eﬀort during both periods, and the eﬀort level in the second period to be higher
than the eﬀort level in first period, i.e., eAi > e
B
i . However, to be able to derive and identify
two diﬀerent closed forms for the cost function (3), we need to normalize eBi = 0, and let e
A
i be
determined by Condition (6).9 Given these two eﬀort levels, we can write the cost function as
cs(esit, .), (7)
where s denotes the type of competitive regime, that can be either "B" or "A". Note that
Equation (7) entails two diﬀerent cost structures that are conditional on the period studied.
4 Evaluating Cost Reductions
The next step consists of proposing specific functional forms for the demand, network, and
cost functions, as well as for the cost reducing eﬀort, in order to derive the set of structural
equations to be estimated. Using data from the Portuguese mobile telephony firms, we are
capable of shedding light on the cost structure that fits reality the best, i.e., we are able of
figuring out which event, the entry of Optimus or the 2000 liberalization, had a significant
impact on the firms’ behavior. This section describes the data, presents the empirical model,
and the estimation results.
4.1 Data
In this study, we use data at the firm level. For the cost and the network equations, this is
the type of data that is usually considered. However, on the demand side, this could constitute
a potential drawback. It is useful to have disaggregated demand data at the consumers level to
estimate the own price elasticity of demand. The advantage of this is that it takes into account
consumers’ characteristics that may aﬀect firms’ behavior, and it allows describing with greater
precision consumers’ decisions. However, we do not have data at the consumer level. This
obliges us to evaluate an average demand elasticity for all the firms of the sample. Note that
this is a minor concern in our study, since our main objective on the demand side is to shed
light on whether firms produce on the elastic or inelastic part of the industry demand curve.
The data we have is perfectly valid for our aim.
9This assumption is justifiable, given that what matters in our analysis is the diﬀerence eAi − eBi . Note that
we do not force eAi to be positive when estimating it.
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The dataset has been constructed for the period 1992-2003 from data collected by Autori-
dade da Concorrência, the Portuguese national competition authority. The data consists of
quarterly observations obtained from the three firms under consideration in our study, namely
Tmn, Vodafone, and Optimus.
The variables were constructed as follows. In the cost function, total costs (cit), production
(yit), wages (ωlit), prices of materials (ωmit), and price of capital (ωkit) correspond to total
operating expenses, telecommunications traﬃc in thousands minutes supplied, total labor costs
over number of employees, costs of supplies, and national interest rates on ten years treasury
bonds, respectively.
With respect to demand and network growth, firm i’s price (pit) for year t is measured as
total revenues over traﬃc supplied. Moreover, the size of i’s network (nit) is measured by the
number of i’s subscribers, and the income per capita (rt) is measured by the Portuguese gross
national product per capita in 1995 prices.
In all three equations, t the time trend, is equal to one in the last quarter of 1992 and
incremented by one each quarter.
4.2 Empirical Implementation
The demand function corresponding to (1), is specified in a log-linear form as follows:
ln yit = α0+αpi ln pit+
X
s=B,A
X
j 6=i
αspij ln pjt+αn−1 lnnit−1+αr ln rt+αtt+αy−1 ln yit−1+u
d
it (8)
where udit is an error term. This specification entails constant own and cross-price elasticities.
Note that the cross-price elasticities αspij are allowed to vary from one period to another, i.e.,
we consider a switching regime methodology that permits estimating diﬀerent cross-price elas-
ticities, depending on whether two firms, during period "B", or three firms, during period "A",
were competing in the industry.
Following the same specification, the network growth function corresponding to (2), is spec-
ified as follows:
lnnit = γ0 + γpi ln pit +
X
s=B,A
X
j 6=i
γspij ln pjt + αr ln rt + γtt+ γn−1 lnnit−1 + u
n
it (9)
where unit is an error term.
We assume a Cobb-Douglas specification for the cost function presented in (3). This spec-
ification retains the main properties desirable for a cost function, while remaining tractable.
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Alternative more flexible specifications, such as the translog function, lead to cumbersome com-
putations of the first order conditions when eﬀort is unobservable.10 The cost function is then
specified as:
ln cit = β0 + βl lnωlit + βm lnωmit + βk lnωkit + βy ln yit + βtt+ θi − eit + ucit, (10)
where ucit is an error term. We impose homogeneity of degree one in input prices, i.e., βl+βm+
βk = 1.
The reader should remember that θi and eit are both unobservable. First, the ineﬃciency θi
is characterized by a density function f (θi), defined over an interval [θL,∞[, where θL denotes
the most eﬃcient firm. Second, the eﬀort eit is defined as follows. Define the cost of eﬀort as:11
Ψit(eit) = exp(µeit)− 1, µ > 0. (11)
Then, using the functional forms of operating costs (10), the cost of eﬀort (11), and the first
order condition for eﬀort (6), we can express the eﬀort level for period "A". The first-order
condition that determines the eﬀort level eA can now be written as:
cit = µ exp(µeit). (12)
Substituting (10) in (12), we can solve for eAit as:
eAit =
1
µ+ 1
¡
β0 + βy ln yit + βl lnωlit + βm lnωmit + βk lnωkit + βtt+ θi − lnµ+ ucit
¢
, (13)
while eBit = 0.
As suggested by the new theory of regulation, the eﬀort level of a firm increases with θi,
i.e., a more ineﬃcient firm optimally exerts more eﬀort than a less ineﬃcient firm, ∂
2C
∂θit∂eit
< 0.
Moreover, firms are willing to provide less eﬀort when eﬀort is more costly, i.e., when the cost
reducing technology parameter µ is larger. Substituting back eAit and e
B
it into (10) allows us to
obtain the final forms to be estimated cA (·) and cB (·). We therefore obtain:
ln cAit = c0 + β
0
l lnωlit + β
0
m lnωmit + β
0
k lnωkit + β
0
y ln yit + β
0
tt+ ζθi + u
c0
it, (14)
and
ln cBit = β0 + βl lnωlit + βm lnωmit + βk lnωkit + βy ln yit + βtt+ θi + u
c
it, (15)
10In particular, in order to solve for Equation (6), plug it into Equation (3), and estimate Equation (7)
applying parametric techniques, we need a Cobb-Douglas specification.
11The function Ψ(·) is a convex, with Ψ(0) = 0, Ψ0(eit) > 0 and Ψ00(eit) > 0.
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where ζ = µ
1+µ , c0 = β0 +
1
1+µ(lnµ− β0), β
0 = ζβ, and uc0it = ζu
c
it. Note that lim µ→+∞β
0
s = βs,
i.e., as the cost of eﬀort grows, the eﬀort level falls, and expression (14) converges to (15). This
implies that if eﬀort is not properly identified, the estimates of the cost elasticities are biased.12
The cost function to be estimated is then:
ln cit = ξ
A
it
£
c0 + β
0
l lnωlit + β
0
m lnωmit + β
0
k lnωkit + β
0
y ln yit + β
0
tt+ ζθi + u
c0
it
¤
+
ξBit
£
β0 + βl lnωlit + βm lnωmit + βk lnωkit + βy ln yit + βtt+ θi + u
c
it
¤
, (16)
where ξAit takes value 1 during period "A", and 0 otherwise, while ξ
B
it takes value 1 during
period "B", and 0 otherwise. In the course of the estimation, several vectors ξAit and ξ
B
it will
be assumed, depending on which scenario is considered, and their results will be tested against
each other, to unravel their eﬀects on competition.
The system of equations formed by (8), (9) and (16) is determined sequentially. Since prices
pit in the demand and network equations (8) and (9) are certainly endogenous, the equations are
estimated with instrumental variables techniques. We use as instruments for pit firms’ average
costs and Portugal gross national product per capita. Note that, in the network equation, the
OLS estimate of the own-price elasticity is not significant, while the instrumental variables
estimate is highly significant. In the demand equation, the OLS and instrument variable
estimates of own-price elasticity are both significant, although the former is lower in absolute
value.
With respect to the cost function (16), note that it includes a non-observable parameter,
θi, which is, from the viewpoint of the econometrician, an unobservable random variable in
the same sense as ucit. Parameter θi plays a central role in the analysis since it is at the same
time the parameter measuring firms’ ineﬃciency and the source of heterogeneity across them.
There has been a long debate on how to estimate cost frontiers with parametric and non-
parametric techniques, each one having specific advantages and disadvantages. We choose here
a parametric technique, i.e., θi is characterized by a Half-Normal density function f (θ) which
needs to be estimated. The main advantage of such framework is its ease of exposition, which
12We could measure the cost reduction after the entry of OPTIMUS estimating two costs functions, one
pre- and one post-entry, and comparing the predicted costs. Our methodology, however, improves upon this
alternative approach for two reasons. First, we estimate the coeﬃcients describing the underlying technology
with a larger sample. Note that, for instance, in order to estimate βy, the alternative methodology would use
information only for the period 1992-1997, while with our methodology, we use information from the period
1992-2003, at the cost of adding one more parameter. And second, in Section 5, we need to estimate marginal
costs to evaluate competition. A biased measure of marginal costs would lead to wrong conclusions about the
evolution of price-cost margins after the entry of OPTIMUS.
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is important for us, since we are more concerned in this article with the discussion around the
cost reducing activity of the firms than with exogenous ineﬃciency. Note that, when estimating
this cost-function, one needs to compute the integral of the joint density function of θi and ucit
over [0,∞[.13
We also expect unobserved shocks to be autocorrelated in the demand and the network
equations. Since we are dealing with time series with periods not too far apart in time, error
terms, which capture omitted variables, measurements errors, or purely unpredictable eﬀects,
might be correlated. A Lagrange test for autocorrelation is computed for each equation and
presented in the next section. It confirms the presence of autocorrelation in the demand and
network equations. Interestingly, accounting for autocorrelation in the network equation re-
duces the lagged network parameter γn−1, suggesting that switching costs are a less important
explanatory variable for the size of the network than what one would expect if autocorrelation
was not accounted for.
Finally, note that the system is identified and all parameters can be recovered, given the
homogeneity of degree 1 in input prices.
4.3 Estimation Results
Tables 1 and 2 provide the results for the econometric model. We emphasize in this section
the two main arguments discussed in this paper. First, depending on how incentives and cost
reduction activities are interpreted, diﬀerent cost structures can be estimated. Then, a test
enables us to choose the best cost structure in the sense that it is the one that fits the data the
best. Once this is done, a precise evaluation of the nature of competition in the industry can
be obtained in a second step. This latter procedure also requires important ingredients on the
demand and network growth sides which are discussed below.
4.3.1 Demand and Network
The results for network and demand are presented in Table 1, where three types of estimation
procedures are considered. In all cases, the goodness of fit measured by the adjusted R2
is close to 1. Model 1 is a simple OLS procedure, where no instruments for price and no
procedure for autocorrelation are considered. Model 2 uses instruments for price. Model 3 uses
instruments for prices and accounts for autocorrelation using the Cochrane-Orcutt method for
13For more details on these issues, the reader should refer to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
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a first-order autoregressive model.14 Note that the variable revenue (rt) has been dropped from
the regressions since it is used as an instrument for price, and keeping it in the equations causes
issues of multicollinearity.
Taken together, the demand and network equations allow us to evaluate short-run and long-
run price elasticities, using a procedure described in the Appendix. The network and demand
functions exhibit a pattern of short-run dynamics. In Table 1, the estimate for the coeﬃcient
of the lagged network size, γn−1, is significant at a 1% level, which implies that a shock to one
of the variables of the network function will fully translate into the network only over time.
Similarly, the estimate for the coeﬃcient of the lagged network size, αy−1 , is significant at a 1%
level.
[Table 1]
The results obtained from Model 3 of the network and demand functions in Table 1 are the
ones we use to discuss the economic issues related to the industry. They suggest the following
three observations:
Observation 1: The industry is characterized by significant network economies. ¥
The short-run demand network elasticity is αn−1 = 0.82, and the long-run demand network
elasticity is ηyn =
αn−1
1−αy−1
= 0.90. This implies that a 1% increase in the size of the network
causes demand to increase by 0.82% (0.90% resp.) in the following quarter (in the long-run
resp.). This result is in line with both economic theory and empirical studies (see Doganoglu
and Grzybowski, 2003, Madden et al., 2004, and Pereira and Pernias, 2004). With respect to
the network function, it can be seen from Table 1 that the short-run network price elasticity is
γp = −0.78, while the long-run network price elasticity is ηnp =
γp
1−γn−1
= −2.12. This implies
that a 1% increase in the price causes the size of the network to decrease by 0.78% in the same
quarter, and to decrease by 2.12% in the long-run. As expected, since most of our data refers
to the period of diﬀusion of the industry, the network increases over time. This can be seen
from the fact that the coeﬃcient of the time trend in the network equation is significant and
positive. This set of results has two main implications. First, it suggests that the size of the
14Several tests are performed in order to test for the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. In the
demand equation, the White’s statisitc is 23, which discards the presence of heteroscedasticity. The Lagrange
statistic is 53.4, indicating that the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation is rejected. In the network
equation, the Lagrange statistic is 72.2, suggesting autocorrelation. The White’s statistic, equal to 5.4, discards
the presence of heteroscedasticity.
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network responds to price variations. Second, it shows that there is considerable inertia in the
way the size of the network responds to price. This can be taken as indirect evidence of the
presence of consumer switching costs in the industry.
Observation 2: The market demand is inelastic with respect to price if indirect eﬀects on the
size of the network are not accounted for. ¥
Table 1 shows that the estimate of the direct short-run price elasticity is ηdsr = −0.63,
while the estimate of the direct long-run price elasticity is ηdlr = −0.69. This suggests that a
1% increase in price causes demand to decrease by 0.63% in the same quarter, and to decrease
by 0.69% in the long-run. These estimates are small but highly significant. Besides, they are
in line with the results reported in previous studies of the mobile telephony industry.15 Note
that, however, the total long-run price elasticity is ηtlr = −2.61. This interesting result shows
that accounting for the long-run impact of a price change is important to evaluate the overall
impact of price on demand.
With respect to cross-price elasticities in both equations, note that changes in the prices of
Vodafone and Optimus are shown to have a non-significant eﬀect on the demand of Tmn. On
the other hand, changes in the price of Tmn have a significant positive impact on the demand
of Vodafone and Optimus. A surprising result is that some of the cross-price elasticities are
negative and significant. For instance, a price decrease of Vodafone may increase the demand
of Optimus. We justify this result in the following way. A decrease in the price of a firm may
have three eﬀects. First, it causes consumers of the rival firms to switch to the firm. Second, it
causes consumers that were outside the market to join the firm. Since most of our data refers
to the diﬀusion period of the industry this second eﬀect is likely to be strong. Third, if network
economies are strong, the increase in the number of consumers in the market caused by the
second eﬀect increases the marginal benefit of consuming the service, which causes consumers
that were outside the market to join any of the firms in the industry. Hence, a decrease in
the price of a firm may increase the demand of its rivals. This may explain why we obtain
significant negative cross-price eﬀects between some firms.
Finally, demand increases over time. The coeﬃcient of the time trend is significant and
positive. This highlights again the importance of accounting for dynamics in the industry.
Note that the time trend captures the growth in demand that occurs for reasons unrelated to
short-run dynamics or network economies, which also exert their impact on demand over time.
15See Hausman (1997), Madden et al. (2004), and OFTEL (2002).
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4.3.2 Costs
Table 2 presents the estimates for the cost function. This equation is estimated under
alternative scenarios related to the entry of Optimus in 1998 and the 2000 liberalization. In all
cases but Model 1, we include the term θi to measure ineﬃciency. Additionally, the following
distinctions are made: (i) Scenario 1, with no eﬀort and no ineﬃciency term, (ii) Scenario 2,
where firms do not make any additional eﬀort to reduce ineﬃciency after the entry of Optimus
and the 2000 liberalization, i.e., the eﬀect of either of these two shocks to the industry is not
accounted for, (iii) Scenario 3, where only the entry of Optimus in 1998 aﬀects firms’ cost
reducing behavior, and (iv) Scenario 4, where only the 2000 liberalization aﬀects the firms’
cost reducing behavior. Additionally, we considered Scenario 1’, which is similar to Scenario 1
without a time trend. The latter model will be useful to discuss returns to scale.
Note that the variables are significant and have the expected sign.16 In particular, costs
increase with input prices and production. Moreover, we propose the following two observations:
[Table 2]
Observation 3: The entry of Optimus caused firms to increase their eﬀort level and reduce
costs. ¥
Figure 2 suggests that the average costs of Tmn and Vodafone decreased from 1997. We
can test that the entry of Optimus had a significant impact on the cost reducing activity of
these firms.
[Figure 2]
The alternative scenarios are tested against each other, applying the tests for model selection
proposed in Vuong (1989).17 The test shows that Scenario 4 is rejected against Scenario 3.
This suggests that the 2000 liberalization had limited eﬀect on the firms’ cost reduction eﬀort,
16The Lagrange statistic is 3.14. Thus, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorre-
lation. The value of White’s heteroscedasticity test is 18.033. Hence, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis
that the residuals are homoescedastic.
17Note that models (1) and (2) are nested in (3). However, models (3) and (4) are non-nested since they are
conditional on a pair of vectors ξAit and ξ
B
it that varies from one model to another, since, in these two models,
deregulation occurs at a diﬀerent point in time. Hence, to test (3) against (1) and (2), we use a likelihood ratio
test for nested models. To test (3) against (4), we use a likelihood ratio test for non-nested models.
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compared to the entry of Optimus in 1998. Scenarios 1 and 2 are rejected against Scenario 3,
which includes an ineﬃciency measure, and assumes that firms exert cost reducing eﬀort after
the entry of Optimus in 1998. Given that Scenario 1 represents the standard approach proposed
by the literature on oligopolistic competition, its rejection advocates the construction of models
including these components, and indicates that one has to be cautious when interpreting the
results derived from other models. Moreover, the rejection of Scenario 2 shows the importance
of accounting for the eﬀects of cost reducing eﬀort on firms’ technology and ineﬃciency.
There are alternative explanations that could possibly justify the increase in cost reduction
after the entry of Optimus. A first possibility is preemptive behavior by the incumbents,
which could have taken the form of capital or capacity expansion with delayed eﬀects on costs.
Preemption in the sense of market foreclosure should be discarded because the decision to
allow the entry of additional firms was taken at the EU level. Preemption in the sense of
preparation for future competition was tested. We estimated alternative scenarios where cost
reduction occurred before the entry of Optimus, namely in 1997 and 1996. Both scenarios were
rejected by our test. Another possible explanation for the cost reduction after the entry of
Optimus could be spillover eﬀects. Optimus could have been a lower cost firm from whom
the incumbents learned. However, the estimation of the ineﬃciency scores θit for each firm
suggest that Optimus is the most ineﬃcient firm. In addition, a lower cost firm would have
optimally charged lower prices. But over our period of observation, Optimus did not oﬀer the
lowest prices.18 Taken together, these two remarks suggest that there is no clear evidence that
Optimus enjoyed any technological advantage that benefited the two incumbents.
Observation 4: The industry is characterized by constant returns to scale. ¥
Scenarios 1 to 4 suggest that the production parameter βy ranges from 1.004 to 1.029. These
parameters are not statistically diﬀerent from 1, indicating that the industry is characterized by
constant returns to scale with respect to traﬃc. This result is consistent with the few previous
studies on mobile telecommunications: McKenzie and Small (1997) shed light on constant
or slightly decreasing returns to scale, while Foreman and Beauvais (1999) find mild scale
economies. We expect costs to increase proportionally to output, since the mobile telephony
is less lumpy, or more modular, than the fixed telephony technology which is characterized by
increasing returns to scale. Mobile telephony firms can meet demand increases by splitting the
18These values are not presented in the paper, but are available upon request.
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cells where their capacity is binding.19 Note that Scenario 1’ contains a production parameter
βy that is significantly lower than 1. This clearly shows the importance of accounting for
technological progress at the moment of identifying returns to scale. The equipment required
to meet the increasing levels of demand is acquired at diﬀerent points in time, representing
diﬀerent technology vintages. Technological progress during our period of observation was very
robust. This makes it hard to disentangle whatever scale economies that might exist from
technological progress if a time trend is not accounted for in the course of the estimation.
5 Evaluating Competition
We focus now on the competitive aspect of our study. Before turning to the evaluation
of firms’ price-marginal cost margins, note that the analysis of the time series of the average
prices of Tmn and Vodafone, presented in Figure 3, shows that the average prices of Tmn and
Vodafone are co-integrated, and have a downward break in 1997. This suggests that the entry
of Optimus in 1998 caused the rivals to reduce prices.20 Note that these price reductions are in
line with our previous results that firms reduced costs following the entry of Optimus.
[Figure 3]
Having now the most adequate cost estimates in hand, we are capable of characterizing
the degree of competition in the industry from the evaluation of firms’ price-marginal cost
discrepancies.21 We will also compare our results with those obtained if cost endogeneity is not
accounted for.
19A cell is an hexagonal geographic region. See Hausman (2002) for a description of the mobile telephone
technology. A cell has a limited number of channels. However, this limit can be overcome. Cells can be split
into smaller cells in order to increase capacity. This implies an increase in underlying infrastructure, such as
the number of base transceiver stations, antennas, supporting towers, backhaul links, base station controllers,
and possibly an upgrade of the mobile switching centers.
20Note that economic theory is not always conclusive regarding the relation between the number of competitors
in a specific industry and firms’ prices. Garcia et al. (2005), Rosenthal (1980), and Seade (1980) develop models
where prices increase with the number of firms in the market.
21By estimating cost and demand functions, we are able to generate direct measures of the price-cost margins.
This approach follows the spirit of Genesove and Mullin’s (1998) paper that shows that direct estimations of the
conduct parameter through the pricing rule may lead to significant underestimation of market power. Similarly,
imposing a specific conduct and estimating costs may lead to over or underestimation of costs when perfect
competition or monopoly are assumed respectively. On the contrary, estimates are quite insensitive to the
assumed demand functional form.
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In an infinite horizon set-up, a firm’s price choice problem, given the eﬀort level, is:
max
pit
∞X
t=0
Πit(pit, eit, nit−1) s.t. nit = N(pit), (17)
where the profit Πit(.) is defined in (4). The Bellman equation for firm i’s pricing problem,
given the eﬀort level, is:
V (nit−1) = max
pit
{Πit(pit, eit, nit−1) + δV (nit)} .
The associated first-order condition for firm i is:
yit + (pit −MCit)
∂yit
∂pit
+ δ (pit+1 −MCit+1)
∂yit+1
∂nit
∂nit
∂pit
= 0, (18)
where MCit denotes marginal cost of firm i, suggesting that a firm’s optimal price at t should
account for two eﬀects. The first eﬀect is the direct impact of the current price on the current
demand, ∂yit∂pit . The second eﬀect is the impact of the current price on the current size of the
firm’s network, and thereby on the next period firm’s demand, ∂nit∂pit
∂yit+1
∂nit
. Equation (18) can be
rewritten as:
Mit =
pit −MCit
pit
= − 1
ηdlr + δ∆yi∆µi∆piηynηnp
, (19)
where ηdlr is the direct long-run price elasticity, ηyn is the long-run demand network elasticity,
and ηnp is the long-run network price elasticity. Additionally, we denote the demand growth of
firm i as ∆yi :=
yit+1
yit
, the margin growth of firm i as ∆µi :=
Mit+1
Mit
, and the price growth for firm
i as ∆pi :=
pit+1
pit
.22
Hence, using our estimates of the cost, network, and demand equations, we evaluate in a
first step the price-cost margins expressed in the left-hand side of Equation (19) under the
various scenarios under consideration. Thus, we determine whether diﬀerent conclusions can
be reached regarding firms’ competitive behavior, depending on which scenario is accounted
for. In a second step, we test these margins against those obtained if firms followed a Nash
behavior, as expressed in the right-hand side of Equation (19).
From the expressions of costs (16), demand (8), and network growth (9), the first-order
condition (19) can be rewritten as:
Mit =
pit −MCi
pit
=
(µ
αpi
1− αy−1
¶
+ δ∆y∆µi∆pi
µ
αn
1− αy−1
¶Ã
γp
1− γn−1
!)−1
. (20)
22We are implicitly assuming a perfect information setting, otherwise we would have to incorporate the firms’
expectations about the future values of the relevant variables.
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Through the estimation of the cost function, marginal costs MCit can be easily recovered.
Putting them together with the observed values of prices, we are able to evaluate the price-
marginal cost marginMit set by each firm, defined as the left-hand side of Equation (20). Table
3 presents the values obtained under Scenario 1 and Scenario 3.
One first interesting result is worth emphasizing. The traditional approach with no inef-
ficiency and no eﬀort, namely Scenario 1, underestimates the average marginal costs MCit,
and overestimates the average margin Mit of the industry. Hence, the traditional approach
underestimates the competition faced by the Portuguese mobile firms. The margins obtained
under Scenarios 1 and 3 are significantly diﬀerent at the 10% level as shown by a t-test (H0 :
M3it −M1it = 0), whose statistic is equal to 1.718.
[Table 3]
In a second step, we simulate the Nash margin MNit , as defined by the right-hand side of
Equation (20). Our aim is to test whether firms follow a Nash behavior, i.e., we test whether
the Nash marginsMNit are close to the real marginsMit. Note that values of the elasticities ηdlr,
ηyn, and ηnp are obtained from the estimation of the network and demand equations while we
need to simulate values for δ, ∆yi, ∆µi, and ∆pi since these latter parameters are unobservable.
If firms have a myopic behavior, i.e., if δ = 0, Equation (20) becomes Mit = − 1ηdlr . The
latter corresponds to the standard static Nash behavior index, whose value is 1.44. This value
is unrealistic, and suggests that the behavior of firms producing on the inelastic part of the
demand curve is not compatible with a static approach. This therefore calls for the dynamic
approach that we advocate in this section.
[Table 4]
In the case where firms care about the future, i.e., if δ 6= 0, we adopt the following approach.
We test the hypothesis that estimated margins Mit are equal to the dynamic Nash margins
MNit expressed in Equation (20). To do so, we set Mit = M
N
it = 0.230,
23 and solve for the
corresponding values of δ, ∆yi, ∆µi, and ∆pi. Table 4 presents the values of ∆yi and ∆µi that
satisfy this condition under the conservative assumption that prices are expected to remain
constant ∆pi = 1.
24 Note for instance that, if firms expect their margins to grow by 25%
(∆µ = 1.25) and demand to grow by 68% (∆y = 1.68), they should have a discount factor δ
23Note that we set Mit =MNit = 0.230 and not 0.088, as suggested by Table 3. The reason is that Optimus,
which appears to have negative margins most of the time, is excluded from the sample for this particular exercise.
We therefore obtain 0.230 as the average of Tmn and Vodafone’s margins over the period of observation.
24Note that ∆pi is the only variable that is fully under the control of operator i, since ∆yi and ∆µi also
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equal to 0.91, i.e., a discount rate  = 1δ − 1 = 0.10. These figures make sense only if firms have
a high discount factor δ, i.e., a small discount rate , and expect a large industry growth. Thus,
in order to reconcile firms’ actual margins and the dynamic Nash margins, one has to assume
that firms: (i) are patient, and (ii) have optimistic beliefs about the industry growth. These
two latter assumptions seem to be relevant in the case of the Portuguese mobile telephony
industry, as illustrated by the following observations: First, note that this is an industry where
it took firms from 3 to 6 years to reach profitability and where network eﬀects and switching
costs play an important role. Our data set refers to a period where the industry had not yet
reached the maturity phase. During this period, firms were conceivably more concerned with
building their customer base than extracting abnormal profits. Second, we could compare the
discount rate  to any relevant discount rate that is currently practiced. Note for instance that
the average interest rate of Portuguese ten years treasury bonds is 6.8% over the period we
study. Likewise, OFTEL (2002) presents estimates of the weighted average cost of capital for
the UK mobile firms in the range of 13% to 17%. These values are in line with our results and
seem to validate our test.
6 Impact on Consumer Welfare
We finally propose an evaluation of the eﬀect of the operating cost reducing activity on
welfare. Note that we are only able to provide an incomplete measure of welfare changes.
Although social welfare is defined as the sum of the consumer surplus and the firms’ profits, we
restrict our analysis to consumer surplus and operating costs. The reason is that our dataset
does not allow us to identify the internal cost of eﬀort, defined in Equation (11), and therefore
characterize fully the change in the firms’ welfare.
Consider the period "A" that starts after the entry of Optimus. We can evaluate the actual
consumer surplus associated to current prices and demand levels, and report the observed
operating costs. We can as well simulate the hypothetical consumer surplus and operating
costs that would have emerged if the firms did not increase their eﬀort level, i.e., if the increase
in cost reducing activity defined in Equation (13) was nil. To compute the hypothetical price
and demand level obtained in a situation where no additional eﬀort is provided, we proceed as
follows.
depend on factors that are beyond its control. Setting ∆pi = 1 allows simplifying our presentation. We could as
well let ∆pi vary. Allowing additional sources of variation only increases our scope to rationalize the estimated
margins.
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Taken together, the two periods before and after the entry of Optimus allow identifying the
cost reducing activity since we considered diﬀerent cost structure for each period. Accordingly,
one can compute a direct measure of the eﬀort activity e. Denote as cA
0
the operating costs after
the entry of Optimus, if no additional eﬀort is provided. From Equation (13), a cost reduction
ratio is therefore ϕ = c
A(.)−cA0(.)
cA0(.) = exp (−e)− 1. From our estimates, the ratio for the average
firm is ϕ = −0.266. This implies that, on average, the increase in cost reducing activity of all
firms after the entry of Optimus led to a 26.6% cost decrease at the industry level.
Now, from (19), we can compute the hypothetical prices that firms would set if their costs
were 26.6% higher during period "A". Assuming that the environment was otherwise expected
to remain stationary, i.e., ∆µi = ∆pi = ∆yi = 1, a 26.6% cost increase would lead to a
26.6% price increase. We therefore set the hypothetical prices, under a situation where the
firms provide no additional eﬀort, to be 26.6% higher than the ones under a situation where
firms optimally provide additional eﬀort. Table 5 presents the changes in operating costs, and
consumer surplus per subscriber after the entry of Optimus. Our results take into account
not only the eﬀect of a price change, but also the variation in the quantity of minutes of
traﬃc consumed. They suggest a quaterly increase in consumer net surplus of 24.8 euros
per subscriber, if operators provide additional eﬀort level, compared to a situation where no
additional eﬀort is provided.
[Table 5]
Thus, competition led to a significant increase in consumer surplus. Unfortunately, our
analysis cannot be extended to the operators’ profit. Although competition induced a large
decrease in operating costs, we are not able to evaluate the associated increase in firms’ internal
costs. This drawback may be solved in the future, if more disaggregated data are available.
7 Conclusion
The results obtained in this paper have proved fruitful on both the methodological and the
institutional side. First, we showed that a cost-network growth-demand structure that accounts
for the firms’ technical ineﬃciency and cost reducing activities fits the data better than the
usual model of the oligopolistic competition literature. Our application of this methodology to
the Portuguese mobile telephony industry shows that the estimates obtained from a standard
oligopoly model are potentially biased and can lead to wrong conclusions about cost reduction
and competition in the industry.
Second, it is suggested that the entry of a third firm in 1998 introduced a significant change
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in the behavior of firms regarding costs reduction. We show that the full liberalization of the
telecommunications sector in 2000 had very limited eﬀects. We also showed that the standard
oligopoly model underestimates the toughness of competition. This result is consistent with
previous contributions that account for cost endogeneity.
The results of this paper illustrate nicely the two channels through which competition can
increase welfare. Competition may lead to a reduction of both prices and costs. Such reductions
occurred in the Portuguese mobile industry, while firms were producing on the inelastic part
of the demand function. This suggests that firms were more concerned with increasing their
customer base than with receiving high profits, as has been tested and validated in this article.
Whether such concerns will vanish in the near future remains to be seen.
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Appendix 1: Short-run and long-run price elasticity
Equation (9) can be rewritten as:
lnnit =
1
1− αnit−1L
"
γ0 + γpi ln pit +
X
s=A,B
X
j 6=i
γspij ln pjt + γtt+ u
n
it
#
, (21)
where L is a lag operator. Replacing t by t− 1 gives:
lnnit−1 =
1
1− αnit−1L
"
(γ0 − γt) + γpi ln pit−1 +
X
s=A,B
X
j 6=i
γspij ln pjt−1 + γtt+ u
n
it−1
#
(22)
After replacing equation (22), equation (8) can be written as:
ln yit =
1
1− αy−1L
½∙
α0 +
αn−1 (γ0 − γt)
1− αnit−1L
¸
+
∙
αt +
αn−1γt
1− αnit−1L
¸
t
+
∙
αpi +
αn−1γpiL
1− αnit−1L
¸
ln pit +
X
s=A,B
X
j 6=i
∙
αpij +
αn−1γpijL
1− αnit−1L
¸
ln pjt +
∙
udit +
αn−1u
n
it−1
1− αnit−1L
¸)
.
which suggests that an increase in i’s price can be decomposed into two eﬀects. First, we define
a direct eﬀect which states that the consumers that choose to stay with firm i, perhaps because
they have large switching costs, demand less of i’s product:
∂ ln yit
∂ ln pit
= αpi . (23)
Second, we define an indirect eﬀect which states that some consumers choose to leave firm i for
a diﬀerent firm, reducing thus the size of i’s network:
∂ ln yit
∂ lnnit−1
∂ lnnit−1
∂ ln pit−1
=
µ
1
1− αy−1
¶µ αn−1γpi
1− αnit−1
¶
. (24)
Hence, we refer to the direct short-run price elasticity as the immediate partial impact of a
change in pit on the demand of firm i measured by:
ηdsr := αpi . (25)
As such partial impact fully translates into the demand of firm i only over time, we construct
in a second step the direct long-run price elasticity measured by:
ηdlr :=
µ
1
1− αy−1
¶
αpi . (26)
Finally, we define the total long-run price elasticity which accounts for both direct and
indirect eﬀects, and is defined as the sum of the two elasticities in (24) and (25). It is therefore
equal to:
ηtlr :=
µ
1
1− αy−1
¶µ
αpi +
αn−1γpi
1− αnit−1
¶
. (27)
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Table 1, Demand and network Equations 
  Equation (9): Network  Equation (8): demand 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant  4.357
*** 
(0.5272) 
5.373*** 
(0.578) 
6.272*** 
(0.368)  
3.758*** 
(0.416) 
4.180*** 
(0.497) 
4.307*** 
(0.365) 
Own Price  -0.023
 
(0.117) 
-0.704*** 
(0.240) 
-0.782*** 
(0.135)  
-0.451*** 
(0.091) 
-0.693*** 
(0.185) 
-0.633*** 
(0.135) 
Cross Prices:         
TMN-VOD 1  -0.359 (0.280) 
-0.009 
(0.458) 
0.225 
(0.180)  
-0.264 
(0.221) 
-0.054 
(0.246) 
0.139 
(0.182) 
TMN-VOD 2  0.327
* 
(0.183) 
0.328* 
(0.179) 
0.138 
(0.110)  
0.126 
(0.147) 
0.125 
(0.153) 
0.127 
(0.112) 
TMN-OPT  -0.244
** 
(0.118) 
-0.045 
(0.138) 
-0.034 
(0.080)  
-0.150 
(0.093) 
-0.022 
(0.110) 
-0.009 
(0.077) 
VOD-TMN 1  -0.215
* 
(0.120) 
-0.230** 
(0.091) 
-0.150*** 
(0.058)  
-0.051 
(0.096) 
0.209*** 
(0.079) 
0.271*** 
(0.059) 
VOD-TMN 2  0.890
*** 
(0.245) 
0.837*** 
(0.240) 
0.438*** 
(0.150)  
0.731*** 
(0.203) 
0.653*** 
(0.212) 
0.607*** 
(0.156) 
VOD-OPT  -0.970
*** 
(0.215) 
-0.900*** 
(0.205) 
-0.565*** 
(0.131)  
-0.652*** 
(0.174) 
-0.507*** 
(0.181) 
-0.392*** 
(0.134) 
OPT-TMN  0.578
*** 
(0.194) 
0.542*** 
(0.183) 
0.438*** 
(0.113)  
0.502*** 
(0.171) 
0.334*** 
(0.172) 
0.483*** 
(0.127) 
OPT-VOD  -0.076 (0.234) 
-0.045 
(0.220) 
-0.049 
(0.138)  
-0.016 
(0.194) 
0.162 
(0.194) 
0.078 
(0.143) 
Lag Network  1.191
*** 
(0.157) 
0.892*** 
(0.167) 
0.632*** 
(0.105)  
0.715*** 
(0.143) 
0.717*** 
(0.156) 
0.824*** 
(0.115) 
Trend  0.399
*** 
(0.156) 
0.558*** 
(0.147) 
0.790*** 
(0.092)  
0.438*** 
(0.124) 
0.331*** 
(0.124) 
0.377*** 
(0.091) 
Lag Demand      0.179
*** 
(0.032) 
0.159*** 
(0.034) 
0.086*** 
(0.026) 
Error Std Deviation  0.207
*** 
(0.014) 
0.198*** 
(0.013) 
0.124*** 
(0.008)  
0.163*** 
(0.011) 
0.170*** 
(0.011) 
0.125*** 
(0.008) 
         
Adjusted R2  0.977 0.979 0.991  0.985 0.984 0.991 
T  109 109 109  109 109 109 
Note Standard deviations are in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. 
Model 1: No instruments for prices; Model 2: Instrumental variables for prices; Model 3: Instrumental variables for prices and treatment for autocorrelation. 
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Table 2: Cost Equation 
 
 Scenarios 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1’) 
0β  -2.640
*** 
(0.468) 
-2.825*** 
(0.417) 
-3.329*** 
(0.422) 
-2.718*** 
(0.437) 
1.364*** 
(0.360) 
lβ  0.736
*** 
(0.046) 
0.736*** 
(0.045) 
0.759*** 
(0.042) 
0.723*** 
(0.048) 
0.514*** 
(0.057) 
mβ  0.176
*** 
(0.031) 
0.141*** 
(0.038) 
0.177*** 
(0.034) 
0.139*** 
(0.038) 
0.062 
(0.041) 
yβ  1.004
*** 
(0.035) 
1.028*** 
(0.038) 
1.029*** 
(0.034) 
1.022*** 
(0.039) 
0.786*** 
(0.039) 
Tβ  -0.047
*** 
(0.004) 
-0.045*** 
(0.005) 
-0.033*** 
(0.005) 
-0.042*** 
(0.006) - 
µ  - - 2.856*** (0.219) 
4.738*** 
(0.964) - 
θ  Standard Dev. - 0.366*** (0.047) 
0.234* 
(0.142) 
0.361*** 
(0.050) - 
Error Standard Dev. 0.251
*** 
(0.017) 
0.123*** 
(0.029) 
0.159** 
(0.070) 
0.126*** 
(0.032) 
0.349*** 
(0.023) 
Adjusted R2 0.971    0.943 
Vuong Test. 
(3) against alternative models 38
(a) 31.3(a) - 2.679(b)  
T 112 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Vuong Test: (a) Nested test. (b) Non-nested test. 
In all models, ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. 
Models: (1) Model with no inefficiency and no effort. 
 (2) Model with inefficiency but no effort. 
(3) Model with inefficiency and effort. Firms exert effort after the entry of Optimus. 
(4) Model with inefficiency and effort. Firms exert effort from full liberalization in 2000. 
 (1’) Same as (1), with no trend. 
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Table 3: Estimated Margins 
 
 itP  itMC  itM  
Scenario (1) 0.514 0.334 0.128 
Scenario (3) 0.514 0.350 0.088 
Note: Average values at the industry level. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Industry Growth levels and Impatience 
 
µ∆  y∆  δ  
 1.907,14 0,10
 229,78 0,83
0,01 219,21 0,87
 209,58 0,91
 200,75 0,95
 19,07 0,10
 2,30 0,83
1,00 2,19 0,87
 2,10 0,91
 2,01 0,95
 15,20 0,10
 1,84 0,83
1,25 1,75 0,87
 1,68 0,91
 1,61 0,95
 12,71 0,10
 1,53 0,83
1,50 0,46 0,87
 0,40 0,91
 0,34 0,95
 9,54 0,10
 1,15 0,83
2,00 1,10 0,87
 1,05 0,91
 1,00 0,95
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Table 5: Welfare Evaluation after Entry 
 
Variable Net Change if “Effort” instead of “No Effort” 
  
∆ Operating costs -23.6 
  
∆ Cons. Net Surplus +24.8 
  
Note: Average values per subscriber, for one quarter, in euros. 
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Figure 1: Revenue Market Shares 
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Figure 2: Average Costs 
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Figure 3: Average Prices 
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